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Abstract 
Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has actively promoted “Internet sovereignty” as a 
means to reshape the discourse and practices of global cyber governance. By analysing 
Chinese-language literature, this article unpacks the Chinese discourse of Internet sovereignty. 
Despite significant interest in promoting it as China’s normative position on cyberspace, we 
find Chinese formulations of Internet sovereignty are fragmented, diverse and under-developed. 
There are substantial disagreements and uncertainty over what Internet sovereignty is and how 
it can be put into practice. This is principally due to the evolving pattern of Chinese policy 
formation, whereby political ideas are often not clearly defined when first proposed by Chinese 
leaders. This article argues that an under-developed domestic discourse of Internet sovereignty 
has significantly restricted China’s capacity to provide alternative norms in global cyberspace. 
Appreciating this ambiguity, diversity and, sometimes, inconsistency is vital to accurate 
understanding of transformations in global cyber governance occasioned by China’s rise.   
* 
“In order to promote reforms in global cyberspace governance, we should insist on the 
following principles: first, respect Internet sovereignty. The principle of sovereign equality 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations is one of the basic norms in contemporary 
international relations. It covers all aspects of state-to-state relations, which also includes 
cyberspace… We should respect the right of individual countries to independently choose their 
own path of cyber development and model of cyber regulation and participate in international 
cyberspace governance on an equal footing.” 
– Xi Jinping, excerpt from his keynote address to the World Internet Conference in 2015 
(Xinhua News 2015) 
 
Introduction 
The rise of digital information communications technologies (ICT), particularly the 
Internet, has played a significant role in political and socioeconomic transformation. One 
common argument is that the Internet has helped to undermine authoritarian regimes, or has 
promoted their removal, by facilitating multiple new modes of information dissemination 
beyond state control. Less often heard, although of equal importance, is the use by authoritarian 
regimes of Internet technologies to further their political ambitions. Not only is China the 
world’s largest authoritarian regime but it is the most populous country in terms of Internet 
users. These factors, and its sophisticated Internet governance strategy, make China a 
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remarkable case study in this field. It has prompted substantial literature examining China’s 
authoritarian use of Internet governance and its political implications (Hughes and Wacker 
2003; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013; Noesselt 2014; Yang 2009; Zeng 2016a; Zheng 2007). Yet, 
China’s normative positions in governing the Internet remain an under-explored aspect of its 
foreign and domestic policy.  
 Coincident with its “peaceful rise”, China has become more willing and able to export 
its norms pertaining to global governance in order to reshape international order in its favour. 
The promotion of “Internet sovereignty” (wangluo zhuquan) indicates a milestone in China’s 
increasing willingness to set norms in the field of global Internet governance. Internet 
sovereignty – also translated as “cyber sovereignty” – was brought to renewed public attention 
during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s address to the Beijing-sponsored World Internet 
Conference in Wuzhen in 2015. As the opening quote indicates, Xi asserted China’s position 
that the Internet should be governed according to the same principles as other fields of 
international relations.  
 While the issue of sovereignty in cyberspace has been discussed in the literature of 
Internet governance, there is a lack of understanding on China’s domestic discourse of “Internet 
sovereignty”.  This is understandable given the relative novelty of Chinese efforts to promote 
their norms of Internet governance in global fora, but is nevertheless a deficit in our 
understanding of contemporary Chinese politics and its implications for global cyber 
governance.   
This article studies how Internet sovereignty is viewed within China, with specific 
reference to academic agreements and disagreements on the meaning and validity of the 
concept. By analysing Chinese language literature, we intend to develop a deeper appreciation 
of the domestic Chinese debate about Internet sovereignty and communicate this to a wider 
non-Chinese speaking community. Despite significant interest in promoting Internet 
sovereignty as a normative position on cyberspace, we find this to be a weakly defined concept 
within China. There are substantial disagreements and uncertainty over what Internet 
sovereignty is and how it can be put into practice, although there is a general agreement with 
the official line that national sovereignty should also apply in cyberspace. At the time of writing, 
the origins, meaning and implementation of Internet sovereignty are sufficiently contested that 
much conceptual development is still required.  
We argue that this is principally due to the evolving pattern of policy formation in China, 
whereby political ideas are often not clearly defined when first put forward by Chinese leaders. 
Many political ideas are still developing and have yet to cohere into stable bodies of theory that 
can be more rigorously tested, and as such are often abstract and immature. This adds to the 
difficulties of scholars trying to unpack Chinese discourses of Internet sovereignty.  
This domestic dynamic, we suggest, has significant implications for understanding the 
transformation of global governance and international order and its articulation with China’s 
rise. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has initiated a series of normative and strategic 
concepts in order to increase its discursive power and influence. It has made considerable 
efforts to transform itself from a “norm taker” into a “norm shaper”, if not yet quite a “norm 
maker” (Pu 2012; Zeng and Breslin 2016). The case of Internet sovereignty provides another 
opportunity to explore this process in Xi’s China. It indicates China’s ambition to legitimise its 
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domestic coercive activities in cyberspace, as well as developing a normative position 
supporting China’s foreign policy and interests abroad.  
Nonetheless, ambition does not equate to success. This article argues that this fragmented, 
diverse, and sometimes immature discourse of Internet sovereignty has significantly restricted 
China’s capacity to provide alternative norms in global cyberspace, let alone apply them in 
global cyberspace governance. It remains to seen when or whether China will be able to 
develop a more rigorous and practical approach to global cyber governance. 
The article is organized as follows. We first review the literature on sovereignty and the 
Internet and then analyse the domestic origin of Chinese Internet sovereignty. This 
demonstrates how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s regime insecurity and its recent shift 
to “social management” policies has translated into a range of stricter policies aimed at 
regulating domestic Internet use, which have been justified using the emergent term, Internet 
sovereignty. We then move to introduce our research methods and identify the links between 
academia and policy formation in China. In the third section, we look more closely at how this 
term has arisen in official discourse, before turning to academic discussions as to how it should 
be interpreted and operationalised. We identify a strong consensus that sovereignty is 
applicable to cyberspace but also disagreements about the derivation of Internet sovereignty 
and the problem of defining sovereign borders in cyberspace. The article concludes with 
remarks on the domestic and international political implications of China’s understanding and 
promotion of Internet sovereignty.  
 
Internet and Sovereignty  
The relationship between the Internet and sovereignty has exercised scholars since the 
1990s and is informed by the transformation of international politics under conditions of 
globalization (Agnew 2009; Cohen 2012; Sassen 1996; Strange 1996). Early analyses 
identified the transnational nature of the Internet as rendering obsolete sovereignty principles 
derived from or operable over discrete physical territory (Johnson and Post 1997; Reidenberg 
1997). Moreover, cyberspace was proposed as a radical space with its own emergent 
sovereignty, beyond the authority or control of states (Barlow 1996; see also Wu 1997). 
Subsequent analyses have picked apart the polysemic concept of sovereignty – “a basket of 
goods that do not necessarily go together” (Krasner 2001, 233) – in an attempt to discern more 
precisely how the Internet affects the theory and practice of sovereignty. 
Betz and Stevens (2011), for instance, find the Internet offers no direct challenge to the 
international legal sovereignty of states. International law grants all states sovereign equality 
and the Internet does not materially affect this situation. In contrast, the Internet has significant 
implications for state sovereignty if this is understood as the ability either to control cross-
border information flows or to exert domestic authority within territorial borders (Betz and 
Stevens 2011, 55-74). This gives rise, perhaps paradoxically, to measures that require 
diminution of sovereignty in one area to preserve it in another. The European Convention on 
Cybercrime (2001), for example, aims to reduce national cybercrime levels through 
transnational police cooperation leading to cross-border investigations. To do this, states must 
“pool” their legal sovereignty but at the expense of their sovereign authority over what happens 
within and across their own borders (Keohane 2002), including changes in national legislation. 
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 This multilateral approach to problem-solving also supports the matrix of Internet 
governance forms, although few have yet attained global reach. It is a matter of much 
discussion, for instance, why there has not yet emerged an overall global regime for 
cybersecurity (DeNardis 2014; Mueller 2010; Nye 2014; Saran 2016). Threats to sovereignty 
are often cited as reasons why states cannot seem to cooperate globally on issues like 
cybercrime and cyberespionage which each individually cites as a threat to national and 
economic security. For fear of jeopardising sovereignty, many states refuse multilateral modes 
of cooperation that might help save it, leading to a fragmented system of global governance 
(Stevens 2017). This is widely seen as evidence of states asserting their “Internet sovereignty” 
in and over cyberspace (Deibert 2010; Demchak and Dombrowski 2013; Gourley 2014).  
Whilst fragmentation may not be terminal for the prospects of Internet governance 
(Mueller 2017; Stevens 2017), it is clear that perceptions of Internet sovereignty differ greatly 
between states, as do norms relating to sovereignty and governance more generally (Brousseau, 
Marzouki, and Méadel 2012). What facet one state prioritises, another may deem less important, 
and competing interpretations of Internet sovereignty are the source of national behaviours that 
engender political conflict between states. This has been particularly noteworthy in the 
relations between China and Western democracies, foremost amongst which is the United 
States (Jiang 2010; Lindsay and Reveron 2015; Powers and Jablonski 2015, 155-179; Shen 
2016; Stevens 2012). 
These analyses are valuable in interrogating inter-state differentiation and why this 
presents obstacles to global Internet governance but do not address domestic Chinese debates 
as to the meaning of Internet sovereignty itself, or how these translate into domestic and foreign 
policy. This article aims to fill the gap by analysing the Chinese domestic debate of Internet 
sovereignty and its impact on China’s position of global cyber governance.  
 
China’s Internet Policy: Domestic Insecurity and Rising Power in Global Cyberspace 
A key domestic frame for Chinese Internet policy is the remarkable diffusion of the 
Internet across its vast population. At the time of writing, the latest official figures (January 
2016) indicate that 688 million Chinese are online, just over half the national population and 
the largest community of Internet users in the world (China Internet Network Information 
Center 2016). Were these “netizens” to form an independent country, it would be the world’s 
third most populous (Carter 2015). Internet uptake is likely to increase as smartphone and 
broadband penetration continues, especially in rural areas. The increased access to Internet 
resources and platforms, including social media, has affected state-society relations in many 
ways. China has yet to face its equivalent of the Arab Spring, or any serious threat to internal 
stability, but like all authoritarian regimes it has viewed with concern the potential catalysing 
effects of Internet and other ICTs on mass civil dissent and disobedience (Brantly 2014; 
Diamond 2010; Lynch 2011; Mackinnon 2012; Morozov 2011).  
For example, China responded nervously to anti-government uprisings in the Middle 
East in 2011 and arguably overreacted to any stirrings of civil dissent, online or off (Breslin 
2012, Dickson 2011). In 2011, when the Arab Spring reached its peak, the Chinese state 
response to the anonymous call for a Chinese “Jasmine Revolution” included extra efforts to 
place human rights activists and dissidents under house arrest or in prison, online censorship 
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of terms like “jasmine”, and deploying police to deter – or perhaps more accurately, to crack 
down on – popular protests (Ramzy 2011).  
Two years later, immediately after the military coup in Egypt in July 2013, the Chinese 
state propaganda machine doubled down on its efforts to link democratization movements in 
the Middle East with potential chaos at home. Here, the CCP’s propaganda strategy followed 
a negative approach that aimed to legitimatize its one-party system by discrediting liberal 
democracy (Zeng 2015). In this context, “Arab Spring” and related terms (e.g. “Jasmine 
Revolution”) suddenly shifted from a political taboo of Chinese state-owned media to a hot 
topic that was frequently mocked in China. To understand this inconsistent response, the 
specific historical conditions of China need to be considered briefly. 
Despite China’s rise, regime insecurity has been a constant concern of Chinese leaders 
(Zeng 2015). While market reforms laid the foundations for China’s present economic status, 
it also leads to rampant corruption and widening disparities between rich and poor that unsettle 
the CCP and its claims to political power. The development and growth of ICTs have 
exacerbated this situation, affording citizens multiple new opportunities to create, find and 
disseminate information at odds with state narratives. The transnational nature of the Internet 
has allowed for an “invasion” of Western liberal ideas like democracy that bring into question 
the legitimacy of the one-party state and the viability of traditional models of centralised 
information control. As such, many argue that the development of Internet would deliver 
democracy in China (Liu and Chen 2012). The Chinese government, however, has responded 
with impressive technical efforts to prevent and deter access to potentially destabilising ideas. 
The best-known of these is the Golden Shield Project, original plans for which date to the late 
1990s (Inkster 2015; Walton 2001). Via the so-called “Great Firewall of China”, this blocks 
access to blacklisted Internet resources and censors network traffic for banned keywords and 
phrases. 1  It also encourages behavioural change in Internet users for fear of criminal 
investigation and prosecution, via a matrix of technical surveillance, legal and regulatory 
measures (Deibert et al. 2011; Deibert 2015). 
Since 2011-12, Internet policies have been further developed to support “social 
management”, a wide-ranging official concept stressing social stability, public security and the 
enduring leadership of the CCP (Pieke 2012). It is a technocratic and creative response to global 
change that preserves the socialist ideology upon which government legitimacy is founded, in 
symbiosis with neoliberal principles that enable economic growth and social mobility. The 
Internet is an important site of social management implementation, in which the state “is both 
more powerful and resourceful and less direct and invasive” (Pieke 2012, 149).  
One example is Sina Weibo, the Chinese microblogging equivalent of Twitter. The state 
has implemented various regulations requiring users to register their real names to use Weibo, 
thereby strengthening its social surveillance capacity. 2 It has also taken more direct efforts to 
suppress anti-government, or pro-liberal, views on Weibo, arresting some well-known opinion-
formers on charges of immoral conduct (e.g. entrepreneur Xue Manzi), or banning others from 
                                                          
1 In concert with the ostensibly defensive Great Firewall China has also developed offensive tools that can be 
directed against opponents of Chinese Internet censorship. See, for example, the “Great Cannon” (Stevens 
2015a). 
2 Interestingly, this kind of censorship on Wechat (the most popular chat app in China) mainly applies to China-
based accounts not international accounts. As a result, it “creates a ‘one app, two system’ model of censorship” 
(Ruan et al. 2016).  
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using social media accounts (e.g. scholar Zhang Lifan) (South China Morning Post 2013, 2014). 
At the same time, local government has adopted Weibo as a means of engaging with citizens 
as part of broader social management policies (Schlæger and Jiang 2014). Central government 
has similarly used Weibo and other platforms to monitor public sentiment, shape domestic 
policy and government information activities, and to ‘neutralize potential threats’ (Sullivan 
2014, 31). As Noesselt (2014) points out, social media, Weibo in particular, have been 
integrated into the regime’s social management strategy in an attempt to enhance its legitimacy. 
In the meanwhile, driven by its regime insecurity, China has also taken impressive 
efforts in adopting ICT to strengthen its domestic surveillance (Zeng 2016a). Its “social credit 
system”, for example, has put forward an ambitious blueprint to digitalize its individual 
archives, in which it records the digital presence activities of every single citizen (Clover 2016; 
Yap and Wong 2015). Since 2015, Internet sovereignty has also been embedded in China’s 
national security law as a part of renewed efforts to secure the one-party system in China in the 
face of growing political opposition (Agence France-Presse 2015). 
In short, historical and contemporary concerns over regime insecurity are played out in 
Chinese government attempts to strengthen its control over domestic cyberspace. This 
domestic regime security concern is often less noticed when discussing China’s rise. For 
example, it is completely missing in Mearsheimer’s (2014) offensive realist analysis of China’s 
rise. However, it plays a crucial role in deciding China’s foreign policy. One characteristic of 
this diverse landscape is a “more assertive authoritarianism at the international level” (Deibert 
2015, 70). In this context, Internet sovereignty has been promulgated at the global level to 
legitimise Beijing’s domestic social management of cyberspace and its wider attempts at 
Internet governance. It also forms a part of China’s political marketing strategy to build soft 
power for the authoritarian regime.  
Moreover, China is calling for support in asserting national sovereignty in cyberspace. 
In the global arena, there is a wider debate in global cyber governance over whether cyberspace 
should be globalized or subordinated to national and territorial concerns. To some, the current 
cyberspace is US-centric and thus problematic in many ways. The case of the US National 
Security Agency’s PRISM clandestine surveillance programme, for example, exposed the 
problem of information and network security in this US-centric cyberspace (Greenwald and 
MacAskill, 2013). PRISM facilitated the collection of personal and commercial data from 
American Internet companies including Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Apple and Microsoft. Its 
surveillance targets included entities of interest not only in China and Russia but also US allies 
such as the EU and its member-states. To many, the case of PRISM shows that the US is taking 
advantage of existing Internet governance mechanisms in favour of its own national interests 
(Lu 2014; Shen 2013). Specifically, these arguments allege that, while promoting ‘Internet 
freedom’ and a tacit acceptance of cyberspace as a global commons beyond the sovereignty of 
any state, the US has abused the notion of public goods so provided (Leavitt 2012; Lukasik 
2000). 
In this regard, some would prefer a sovereign, nationally partitioned cyberspace. Thus, 
countries including Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and Iran have taken a similar position with 
China to support a more traditional state-centric, sovereignty-oriented regime (Stevens 2015b). 
This position on state’s sovereign rights in cyberspace is based on conventional readings of 
territorial rights and obligations, rather than on “Western” narratives of global information 
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flows across an “open” Internet or global cyber commons (Nocetti 2015). To some extent, 
China’s World Internet Conference in Wuzhen since 2014 has served as a summit for those 
countries to openly align themselves against the current global and private sector-led regime 
promoted and dominated by the US. This again reflects China’s importance and leadership 
credential in contesting the US-dominated international order.   
Indeed, even before its first World Internet Conference, China actively took the lead in 
various regional governance bodies to assert the principle of Internet sovereignty and reshape 
existing cyber norms. In September 2011, for example, China along with other five members 
of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan) submitted a document “International Code of Conduct for Information Security” 
to the United Nations in order to formalize new rules and norms in cyber governance. 
According to the then director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, it 
was “rather vehemently rejected by the United States and most Western states, who see the 
effort as aimed at establishing a strict national sovereignty model over content flow over the 
Internet and potentially a tool of oppressive regimes” (Hitchens 2014). After this initiative 
failed to win global support, an updated Code of Conduct was submitted to the UN in January 
2015. Despite its controversy, the notion of Internet sovereignty remains a crucial component 
of this updated version (Rõigas 2015).  
As the following sections will show, while China is taking the lead to promote Internet 
sovereignty, it does not yet have a firm conceptualisation or consistent definition of what 
Internet sovereignty is or entails.  
 
Methods and Formation of Political Ideas in China 
In order to understand the Chinese discourse of Internet sovereignty, this article surveys 
the Chinese language literature on this topic, including Chinese academic journals, newspapers 
and policy documents. We searched China National Knowledge Infrastructure, the largest 
journal database in China, for two key words “Internet/cyber” (wang luo) and “sovereignty” 
(zhu quan). All articles with these two words in their titles are included in our database, which 
focuses inevitably on articles published after 2012, when the term “Internet sovereignty” began 
to emerge in explicit fashion. Our pilot study first briefly read through all the articles found 
through key word search and then identified the key themes in the Chinese debate. Afterwards, 
we analysed those articles with a focus on the disagreement and consensus among those key 
themes.    
The nature of the database means that we were unable to examine internal policy 
documents or the views of dissidents. The former are not available for public research and the 
latter have little policy relevance. We also do not claim that this academic discussion translates 
directly into policy in China; far from it. Nevertheless, it can play a significant role in shaping 
emerging policies. This influence is related to how political ideas develop in China, as 
mentioned before. When Chinese top leaders put forward new political ideas, they are often 
not clearly defined, serving more as guidelines (if not slogans) for policy than as precise 
blueprints (Zeng, Xiao and Breslin 2015). The subsequent process of imbuing these concepts 
with meaning and substance often occurs in an incremental manner. Academic and political 
discussions play key roles in steering and shaping the development and emergence of these 
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policy ideas. Recent examples under Xi Jinping’s leadership include diplomatic initiatives like 
“New Type of Great Power Relations” and “One Belt, One Road”’.  
When Xi Jinping first proposed to establish the so-called “New Type of Great Power 
Relations” in 2012, it was a loosely articulated diplomatic initiative targeting Sino-US relations, 
specifically how to manage potential conflicts within this bilateral relationship. Yet, the 
subsequent development of this concept, informed by different interpretations and uses by the 
Chinese academic and policy community, has extended it into a much broader initiative (Zeng 
2016b). It now refers not only to China’s bilateral relations with the US but also with other 
major powers like the European Union (Zeng and Breslin 2016). Similarly, ‘One Belt, One 
Road’ – the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road – has evolved 
from China’s periphery diplomacy in 2013 into a broad global strategy that even targets 
countries like Australia and Brazil that have little to do with China’s ancient Silk Road (Zeng 
2017).  
We argue that this is also the case for Internet sovereignty. When Xi Jinping promoted 
this concept in Wuzhen in 2015, he did not elaborate on its specifics. Xi asserted that 
sovereignty matters in cyberspace affairs and that the state should exercise some form of 
control over cyberspace within the context of the international system of state sovereignty. As 
will be demonstrated below, Chinese scholars recognise its conceptual elasticity and seek to 
improve its clarity and applicability in order to influence Chinese policy.3  
    
The Chinese Search for Internet Sovereignty 
Despite the concept of Internet sovereignty being brought to wide public attention by Xi 
Jinping’s address in 2012, the emphasis on national sovereignty is not entirely novel. Beyond 
the relatively new Internet industry, this emphasis on sovereignty has a long historical pedigree 
in China’s communications infrastructure industry. As early as the late Qing dynasty, Chinese 
nationalists had struggled to secure national independence against Western hegemony in 
industrial communication and transportation. The Qing dynasty’s weak military strength forced 
it to let Britain, Denmark and Russia take full control over this industry until 1899 (Pitt, Levine, 
and Yan 1996). The struggle to be rid of foreign influence prompted domestic uprisings, not 
least the “Railway Rights Protection Movement” in the second decade of the twentieth century. 
The Qing dynasty’s attempted suppression of this movement triggered a revolutionary uprising 
that eventually ended two millennia of Chinese imperial rule (Rankin 2002).  
As a result of this bitter early experience, the Chinese government tends to view 
telecommunications as a matter of “high politics” intertwined with national strategy and 
military value, rather than “social or economic benefit” (Pitt, Levine, and Yan 1996). This 
perception has shaped a highly conservative telecommunications policy with strict control over 
foreign investment (Pitt, Levine, and Yan 1996; Yan 2002).  
                                                          
3 There are many channels through which they can achieve this. Leading scholars are invited to lecture officials 
at all levels of government, from local institutions to central ministries, and even the politburo, the most 
powerful organ of central government, attended by the top 25 Chinese leaders (Tsai and Dean 2013). State 
research councils and governmental organizations also fund social science projects that will generate policy 
advice. Indeed, the general character of Chinese scholarship on politics and international relations is one of 
policy advice, rather than theoretical development, as demonstrated by previous studies (Zeng 2016; Zeng, 
Xiao, and Breslin 2015; Zeng 2015, 96-114). 
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When it comes to cyberspace, the nationalistic emphasis on sovereignty has long 
underpinned China’s Internet policy. The avoidance of foreign manipulation has always been 
one of the most important goals of China’s Internet policy. As discussed before, in 
contemporary China the regime has developed various national projects – such as the Great 
Firewall of China – to secure its Internet information and networking since the late 1990s. 
Nonetheless, China had not actively promoted these domestic Internet policies on the global 
stage in order to reshape global discourses of cyber governance until Xi Jinping took power. 
Xi’s high-profile promotion of Internet sovereignty openly articulates China’s desire to contest 
the existing multistakeholder model of Internet governance promoted by the US. This involves 
traditional states and international organizations, as well as a range of new institutions, non-
state actors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), technical advisory bodies, civil society, 
and private entities, arrayed and operating in distributed and networked fashion (DeNardis 
2014:23).  
China has sought, for example, to participate in and reform the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the US-hosted non-profit organisation that manages 
and maintains Internet “namespace” (Mueller 2011). This ambition is listed as an explicit goal 
of China’s Information Development Strategy (State Council of China 2016). China and its 
allies sought to counter perceived US influence over ICANN by forcing the US Department of 
Commerce to abandon a contract with ICANN that China and others consider deleterious to 
global cybersecurity. China has worked since the early 2000s to this end. For example, China 
hosted ICANN meetings in 2002 and 2013, and Chinese Internet giants such as Alibaba and 
Tencent, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the Internet Society of 
China, have participated actively in ICANN’s affairs in the multi-stakeholder model that 
structures ICANN’s activities and networks. At the same time, China and Russia have worked 
tirelessly in regional fora like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and international 
organizations like the International Telecommunications Union to undermine the American 
position. In October 2016, the US government severed its formal ties with ICANN, a decision 
perceived widely as a victory for China and Russia (Kessler 2016). The Deputy Director of the 
National Internet Information Office called the handover a progressive step in global cyber 
governance and a valuable attempt to “bridge the digital divide between developing and 
developed countries” (Li 2016).  
In the context of Internet sovereignty, China’s move was less a displacement of the US 
than an attempted entrenchment of state prerogatives in global Internet governance. China and 
its allies pursued the ICANN issue in order to reimpose multilateralism on multistakeholderism. 
Whilst it is important not to over-state the influence of states on the day-to-day technical 
management of the Internet (Van Eeten and Mueller 2012), Internet sovereignty of the Chinese 
kind implies strongly that states should have the final say in determining global Internet policy 
(Han 2016).  
This undercuts the more pluralistic visions of multistakeholderism and is consistent with 
China’s position on other issues of global governance. From a Western perspective, global 
governance is informed by neoliberal imperatives that allow for the incorporation of 
international organizations, NGOs and civil society in decision-making if this improves the 
circulation of capital. This “governance without government” model (Rosenau and Czempiel 
1992; Held et al. 1999) is at odds with a Chinese state that can no more allow for such 
distributed governance abroad than it can at home. The CCP still plays the central role in 
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internal socioeconomic affairs and the development of NGOs and civil society is highly 
controlled. In this regard, China’s global governance efforts downplay the role of non-state 
actors for domestic reasons as much as international ones. 
 The following discussion will focus on China’s contemporary search for Internet 
sovereignty. As Figure 1 shows, academic discussions about the relationship between national 
sovereignty and the Internet date back to at least 1998. Since then, Chinese scholars have 
engaged actively with the challenges brought by the Internet and new technologies to China’s 
national sovereignty. Not surprisingly, its impact on the political system is a key focus. It is 
argued, for example, in an article published in 1998, that the US may take advantage of its 
“information hegemony” in cyberspace to promote regime change in developing countries (Lao 
and Xiao 1998:29). This is to say, even if the concept of Internet sovereignty had not been 
explicitly used, the preliminary idea – that sovereignty applies in cyberspace – has deep 
historical roots in Chinese academic discussions. Given the aforementioned contested origins 
of Chinese telecommunication industry and the concern over regime security, this is hardly 
surprising.  
Scroll forward to today’s China and a very different focus of debate on Internet and 
sovereignty was evident when Xi Jinping proposed to respect Internet sovereignty. While the 
current academic debate still emphasises the challenges posed by the Internet to sovereignty 
and, more specifically, to one-party rule, new agendas have gradually come to the fore. Early 
debate prioritised analysis of these challenges but current discussions aim to provide specific 
and policy-related solutions to those challenges in the form of Internet sovereignty. The desire 
to legitimize China’s normative position on cyberspace has driven Chinese scholars to 
elaborate the idea of Internet sovereignty and how it can be put into practice, as we shall discuss 
in the following sections. 
 
Figure 1: Number of articles in Chinese language literature with “Internet sovereignty” 
or “Internet” and “sovereignty” in the title  
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Source: Data collected on 23 May 2016 from China National Knowledge Infrastructure, 
www.cnki.net/. 
 
Consensus 
At the outset, it is important to note the concept of Internet sovereignty does not enthuse 
all Chinese elites, especially those of a liberal persuasion. To them, the instigation of this policy 
represents an attempt to condone state control of people’s rights to access and use the Internet 
and impinges upon freedom of speech (e.g. Dong 2015; Fu 2015; Li 2015; Yu 2015). They 
argue that citizens’ Internet rights extend to, one, the freedom to access the Internet and, two, 
the freedom to share content on the Internet. The state has a responsibility to ensure the former 
and not to censor or otherwise interfere with the latter. In both cases, the state should not 
discriminate between Internet users; their rights, as understood, are absolute, not relative or 
contingent.  
It is further suggested in this literature that the World Internet Conference (2015), at 
which Xi Jinping proposed the idea of Internet sovereignty, was something of a “joke”: it was 
“a gathering of ‘third-rate countries’ picking a quarrel with advanced (liberal) countries” (Li 
2015). The only purpose in promoting this idea was to try and block foreign information and 
thus enable the government to better “deceive the public” (Yu 2015). Needless to say, this sort 
of dissenting voice often spreads online with little impact on actual policy, not least as these 
opinions are disbarred from appearing in official academic journals.4 This article will focus on 
academic studies that attempt to define Internet sovereignty in a policy context, as well as 
discussing how to put this concept into practice.  
Among those academic studies, there is consensus on two aspects of Internet sovereignty. 
First, it is a relatively new concept and its definition is therefore unclear. Precisely because of 
this, the academic articles we examine aim and call for developing the theory of Internet 
sovereignty (e.g. Gao and Chen 2016; Liu 2012). As identified previously, when new ideas are 
put forward by Chinese leaders they are often not defined clearly. There follows a process of 
imparting meaning and substance to policy ideas, in which academic and other discussions play 
key roles. This is also the case with Internet sovereignty, which is why consideration of 
academic debates is important in this context. The second broad consensus affirms that, despite 
the imprecision of the term, China should seek to protect and promote its Internet sovereignty, 
contra the opinion of many online dissenters (e.g. Wang 2012; Wang 2013; Yu 2012). Internet 
sovereignty is therefore framed as one means through which to defend and preserve China’s 
national interests. 
 
Disagreements 
Consensus therefore exists about the imprecision yet importance of Internet sovereignty but 
there are significant disagreements about three issues that arise from its consideration: the 
relationship between Internet sovereignty and “information sovereignty”; the origins of the 
                                                          
4 This kind of irony against official language is not unique to “Internet sovereignty” but exists widely in 
subverting other official concepts (e.g. Nordin and Richaud 2014). 
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term, Internet sovereignty; and the problem of how and where to define “network frontiers”. 
We address each in turn. 
 
Internet Sovereignty and Information Sovereignty 
The first area of disagreement concerns the fundamental applicability of the concept of 
Internet sovereignty. As noted above, some reject it on ideological grounds, as it promotes the 
essential right or obligation of the state to restrict freedom of expression. In contrast, the 
scholars under consideration here accept the state should exert control over the Internet: why 
should cyberspace be exempt from state control, given that few other environments are so 
excluded? Within this group of scholars, however, there is disagreement over whether Internet 
sovereignty is the optimal term to describe this political endeavour. 
Indeed, before the term “Internet sovereignty” was widely accepted in China, academic 
discussions often referred to “information sovereignty” (Du and Nan 2014; Guo 2010; Ren 
2007; Yang 2006, 2012; Yu 2003, 33). To Yang Zewei, a professor in law, for example, 
information sovereignty refers to sovereign states’ rights to autonomy and independence (Yang 
2006, 2012). A sovereign state has the rights to (a) control transboundary information, (b) to 
regulate and manage how information flows in and out of a country as well as jurisdiction over 
disputes arising in this context, and (c) to share information based on international cooperation 
(Yang 2006, 2012). This definition is adopted in major textbooks of law and communication 
in China (Guo 1999, 251-252; Yu 2003, 33).  
Some argue that information sovereignty reflects national sovereignty in cyber activity 
(Guo 2010; Ren 2007, 74). It is the state capacity to “protect”, “manage” and “regulate” 
information (Kong 2000; Liu and Chang 2005; Ren 2007, 72). In other words, the word 
“information” in this “information sovereignty” concept only refers to information in 
cyberspace. In this sense, as “information sovereignty” already reflects national sovereignty in 
cyberspace, why is there a need to introduce a new concept like Internet sovereignty to refer to 
the same thing?  
Others argue that the two concepts are not equivalent (Du and Nan 2014). Information 
exists outside of cyberspace and also pre-exists the Internet. Information sovereignty is 
therefore not a new concept and has a similarly long history to, for example, political 
sovereignty and cultural sovereignty (Du and Nan 2014).5 Internet sovereignty, on the contrary, 
is a new concept developing only with the emergence of Internet. In addition, Internet 
sovereignty not only refers to information “within” cyberspace but also the platforms that 
produce, transmit and share that information. Therefore, Internet sovereignty is a broader yet 
more accurate concept than information sovereignty when considering the implications of 
cyberspace for national sovereignty (Du and Nan 2014).6  
                                                          
5 Indeed, the Chinese debate on governing cyberspace is closely related to the sense of ‘cultural sovereignty’ 
(Cornish 2015). 
6 We do not explore here the conceptual and practical links between certain conceptualizations of information 
sovereignty and the insurgent term, “data sovereignty”, defined as governments’ “exclusive authority and 
control over all virtual public assets” (Irion 2012, 41), although they are clearly related. 
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Notably, “information sovereignty” was used by Xi Jinping in 2014 to refer to what he 
now means by Internet sovereignty. According to Xi:  
Although the Internet is highly globalized, the sovereignty of the information of all 
countries should be respected. No matter how developed a country’s Internet technology 
is, it must not violate the information sovereignty of others (People’s Daily, 2014). 
This suggests that the two terms are being conflated in official discourse. The evidence does 
not allow us to determine if this is a function of unfamiliarity with relatively novel ideas, or if 
it betokens the eventual substitution of Internet sovereignty for information sovereignty. This 
is an evolving discourse on the relationship between sovereignty and the Internet and key terms 
have yet to stabilise in use and meaning. Other foundational terms like “cyberspace” are 
similarly fluid in their characterisation and application. This is hardly unique to the Chinese 
case alone, the global terminological appeal to “cybersecurity”, for example, generally being 
“often elastic in definition and elusive in practice” (Stevens 2016, 23). 
 
Origins of Internet Sovereignty 
A second disagreement concerns the origins of the idea of Internet sovereignty itself. 
Some consider it a Chinese invention. Ye Zheng, a senior director of the Chinese Academy of 
Military Sciences, finds that Internet sovereignty is a specifically Chinese innovation in the 
theory of political sovereignty, expressly intended to support Chinese national security (Ye 
2015). To Zhi Zhenfeng, a scholar based in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, it is a 
Chinese solution for improving global Internet governance and reflects China’s intention to be 
a responsible Internet power (Chen 2015).  
Others argue that Internet sovereignty is the product of multilateral cooperation, or is at 
least supported by groups of like-minded nations. Two differing perspectives on the 
multilateral origins of Internet sovereignty are represented within this group of scholars. One 
identifies Internet sovereignty with the balancing actions of less-developed countries against 
more highly-developed nations; the other traces its roots to Western applications of sovereignty 
to cyberspace. 
In the first case, Internet sovereignty is conceived as the outgrowth of collective actions 
by less-developed countries to defend their national interests against more developed countries 
(An 2016; Lu 2014; Zhang and Ren 2016). According to Lu Chuanying, a scholar on 
cyberspace and global governance based at Shanghai Institute of International Studies, states 
divide into three categories of ‘Internet power’, according to the distribution of power and 
influence in cyberspace: developed Internet powers, emerging Internet powers, and developing 
Internet powers (Lu 2014). Developed Internet powers, the US in particular, argue that the 
Internet is a global commons, over which no state may lay claim on the basis of national 
sovereignty. If other states do not constrain US activities in cyberspace, this assists implicit US 
hegemonic claims over the global Internet and furthers US national interests. However, it is 
also argued that the US is practicing a double standard (Gao and Chen 2016; Lu 2014). 
Domestically, the US has strengthened its supervision and state surveillance, as well as its 
transnational surveillance and intelligence practices and capabilities, as illustrated by the case 
of Edward Snowden, but also captures the intensification of US domestic surveillance in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Indeed, some Western commentators 
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suggest that the official Chinese push to formalise Internet sovereignty is a direct response to 
the Snowden disclosures of 2013 (Livingston 2015). 
Emerging Internet powers like Russia and China have some strength in Internet 
technology and capacity (Lu 2014). Unlike developed Internet powers, they argue that state 
sovereignty should be respected in cyberspace affairs. They also adopt a more defensive 
position in terms of national (cyber) security and position themselves against the prospects of 
US Internet monopoly or hegemony. Thus, this group of countries are active promoters of 
Internet sovereignty. According to Lu (2014), this group includes Russia and China, but the 
identities of other members of this grouping are unclear. For example, do Brazil and India 
belong to this group, not least as both have been vocal in criticising US actions in cyberspace? 
(Ebert and Maurer 2013).  
Lu (2014) considers developing Internet countries as the weakest category of countries, 
in that they have to accept the relevant Internet technology and standards developed by the 
previous two groups. States in this group have to rely on and work with emerging Internet 
powers in order to better secure their national interests. Although the reasoning is left unstated, 
from the broadly Marxist perspective of these commentators the cooperation between 
developing and emerging Internet powers is a means of challenging and, ultimately, 
diminishing US hegemony.7 Thus, Lu (2014) argues that to promote Internet sovereignty is one 
way of fostering equality and justice in cyberspace.  
The second angle sees Internet sovereignty as an originally Western creation. As briefly 
mentioned above, it is argued that the US has actively promoted domestic supervision and state 
surveillance through Internet technologies. In this regard, the US is “the pioneer and leader” of 
Internet sovereignty (Lu 2014). This idea can also be traced to the Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, published under NATO auspices in 2013 (Cui 
2013; Gao and Chen 2016; Yuan 2016a; Yuan 2016b). The product of a working group of 
international lawyers drawn from NATO member-states, this document does not mention 
Internet sovereignty specifically but endorses the applicability of state sovereignty to 
cyberspace. According to Rule 1,  
A state may exercise control over cyber infrastructure and activities within its 
sovereign territory… Accordingly, cyber infrastructure situated in the land 
territory, internal waters, territorial sea (including its bed and subsoil), 
archipelagic waters, or national airspace is subject to the sovereignty of the 
territorial State. (Schmitt 2013, 15-16) 
This principle is frequently used by Chinese scholars to legitimize China’s position on 
Internet sovereignty (e.g. Cui 2013; Zhu 2015). In this sense, it is the US rather than China that 
initiated the principle of national sovereignty in cyberspace. Thus, there should be no reason 
for the US to oppose China’s normative position on Internet sovereignty, which is merely a 
restatement of that principle.  
Some Chinese scholars are critical of the Tallinn interpretation, a critique that is closely 
bound up with practical considerations about how and to define the boundaries of the Internet 
(Chen 2014; Yuan 2016a; Yuan 2016b). In order to operationalise Internet sovereignty, there 
                                                          
7 Zhang Chunhou (2012), a professor at Yan’an University, uses a more explicitly Marxist term, “network 
colonization”, to describe hegemonic powers who attempt to overthrow foreign regimes.   
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must be more precise identification of where “network frontiers” or “network borders” lie, so 
as to be able to project sovereignty over the spaces within those frontiers or borders, howsoever 
defined. Network frontiers do not map directly to geographical borders, as indicated by the 
argument that it is unfair to use the geographic locations of cyber infrastructure, per the Tallinn 
Manual, as the sole criterion to define network frontiers (Yuan 2016a; Yuan 2016b). If we 
applied this rule, much of the Internet would be in American territory and subject to US 
sovereignty, as most Internet root servers and many enterprise servers are located there (Yuan 
2016a; Yuan 2016b).  
Similarly, neither is it equitable to define Internet borders by the quantity of information 
resources, population of netizens, or the economic scale of national networks, according to 
Yuan Yi, a scholar based in the People's Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Sciences 
(Yuan 2016a; Yuan 2016b). As most information on the Internet is available in English, China 
could lay claim only to a very small portion of Internet “territory” if integuments were 
determined by the relative size of information resources (Yuan 2016a; Yuan 2016b). The only 
favourable way would perhaps be by population of netizens, which would grant China the 
largest share by some margin. Nonetheless, we find little support for this principle in China. 
Debate has therefore turned to how best to define network borders/frontiers in respect of 
Internet sovereignty. 
Defining Network Frontiers 
As identified previously, there is no simple correlation between geographical borders and 
the borders of the state in cyberspace (see also, Johnson and Post 1997). There are at least three 
contrasting perspectives on this issue in Chinese literature, all of which are concerned with how 
best to define borders as a means of implementing Internet sovereignty in practice. 
The first leverages the Tallinn interpretation outlined above and uses the geographic 
locations of cyber infrastructure to determine where network frontiers lie (Liu 2012; Wang 
2012). As such, the responsibility for regulating certain behaviours in cyberspace lies with the 
state within whose conventional territorial borders those activities originate (Liu 2012; Wang 
2012). Following this logic, this applies even to those situations in which, for example, an actor 
in country A attacks country B using the resources of country C. Country C would still be 
responsible at some level for those actions and should regulate to control such actions.  
Proponents of this view are fully aware of its potential consequences, as it may benefit 
countries like the US that possess developed network technologies at the expense of those that 
do not. The latter may suffer from cyberattack conducted in countries which have better 
technology. In this sense, the opposite argument is also valid: that more developed countries 
can be used by actors in less-developed countries to launch attacks, although this is not noted 
in the relevant literature. Nonetheless, it is argued that this may motivate less-developed 
countries to prioritise network defence technologies and physical facility protection (Liu 2012). 
In this regard, the efficiency with which network frontiers can be determined is considered 
more important than fairness.  
The second view moves the debate forward by developing the idea of “non-physical 
network frontiers”. Two types of network frontier are proposed: tangible and intangible (Ye 
and Zhao 2014; Yuan 2016a; Yuan 2016b). Tangible network frontiers include national 
network infrastructure and core network systems such as finance, telecommunication, 
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transportation, and energy, as described by the Tallinn Manual. Intangible network frontiers 
consist in, for example, top-level Internet domain names like .cn or .uk. These are counted as 
national territory and those Internet locations that take these domain names exist within these 
intangible but sovereign “borders”.  
Alternatively, Hao Yeli, a retired major general, retains “tangible network frontiers” but 
introduces a new term, “flexible frontier”, to replace “intangible network frontiers”. According 
to Hao, there are three layers of network frontiers (Hao 2015). The outermost layer is also the 
so-called “flexible frontier” (also referred by Hao as “capability frontiers”). It refers to the 
range of a country’s national Internet capacity. The middle layer refers to the geographical 
border including cyber infrastructure and domestic public opinion field. Here, it transcends the 
tangible network as it includes the public opinion field. In the Chinese context, more 
specifically, to defend this border means the government needs to actively resist the “invasion” 
of Western liberal ideas like democracy that might challenge the current one-party system. 
Lastly, the innermost layer refers to the core circle of the CCP regime. Needless to say, this 
model is heavily inflected with regime security concerns. Compared with the first view outlined 
above, it is, of course, much harder to decide where these borders lie and what lies within them.   
The third view uses levels of network access to define where network borders lie. Similar 
to the categorisation of maritime delimitation, i.e. international waters, territorial waters, 
exclusive waters, it is argued that cyberspaces could be divided into public networks, territorial 
networks and exclusive networks (Yuan 2016a; Yuan 2016b). Public networks are similar to 
international waters of the global commons that are not restricted by internal borders, although 
they are negatively defined by external borders. Everyone in the world has free access to those 
public networks, regardless of nationality. Similar to territorial land, water and airspace, 
territorial networks include networks that are isolated from the outside world such as 
government and military intranets. Access is only granted to authorised actors and unauthorised 
access is treated as a violation of Internet sovereignty. Exclusive networks are analogous to 
exclusive waters, and share information with external locations but operate strict controls over 
access, such as business, finance and e-government services (Yuan 2016a; Yuan 2016b). An 
everyday example would be online banking services that are only available to authorised 
banking customers.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
This preliminary analysis has explored academic contributions to the emerging debate 
about Internet sovereignty in China. There exists significant consensus that Internet 
sovereignty is a proper concern for the Chinese government and that China’s interests are well-
served by pursuing Internet sovereignty as a matter of formal policy. At the same time, there 
are several areas of disagreement amongst scholars able to participate in these discussions. The 
first is an unresolved discussion about the relative merits of the terms, “information sovereignty” 
and “Internet sovereignty”, and whether they are cognate or not. There are hints that Internet 
sovereignty may replace information sovereignty as the official term of choice, although the 
evidence is insufficient to make a strong case for this. If this terminological and policy shift 
occurs, it may represent a broadening of the concept of sovereignty with respect to information 
communications technologies. This argument is further substantiated by considering that the 
alternative translation of wangluo zhuquan is ‘cyber’ sovereignty. The use of ‘cyber’ elsewhere 
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in the world, particularly in the West, is often deliberately non-specific and acts as a broad 
rubric under which all manner of ICT-related activities can be grouped, regardless of their 
affinities and relationships (Stevens 2016, 3-4). This presents opportunities for the extension 
of sovereign power and control where previously these were limited (Dunn Cavelty 2007). 
“Cyber”, and to a certain extent, “Internet”, are far more politically useful terms than 
“information” alone. 
The second area of disagreement is a more abstruse debate over the origins of the term 
‘Internet sovereignty’ itself. Some authors identify its origins in China alone, others in a 
multilateral drive to balance US hegemony. There is also recognition that Western powers, 
particularly through the NATO-sponsored Tallinn Manual process, have already articulated a 
form of Internet sovereignty, inasmuch as they recognise a state’s sovereignty over cyber 
infrastructure and activities within its sovereign borders. In this case, the West should not 
protest too much about China’s very similar argument as to the validity of Internet sovereignty 
as a principle upon which international ‘cyber’ relations should be founded. The problem, 
however, is precisely how and where to draw those sovereign borders, as the third area of 
debate around ‘network frontiers’ illustrates. In keeping with the role of Chinese academics as 
advisors on practical implementation as well as policy refinement, this is a more technical 
discussion about where sovereignty applies and how to define its limits.  
These debates follow the conventional pattern of policy development in China. Concepts 
and policy ideas are expressed in initially inexact fashion by high-level officials, in this case 
President Xi, and are elaborated through consultation and negotiation, re-emerging later as 
China’s policy narratives. The preliminary empirical inquiry presented here is but a snapshot 
of the early stages of this process and it is unclear precisely what form of Internet sovereignty 
will ultimately exist in official policy and China’s global stance, although its broad parameters 
are clear and form an identifiable facet of current Chinese domestic and foreign policy. The 
question remains, then, as to the political functions of Internet sovereignty now and in the 
immediate future. 
As identified previously, Chinese Internet policies have both domestic and international 
aspects, each of which is intimately tied to concerns about regime security. From the 
perspective of the CCP, threats to regime security derive from both domestic sources and from 
external influence, the latter particularly mediated by the Internet. Domestic Internet censorship 
is therefore geared both to suppressing indigenous political dissent and to restricting the influx 
of foreign ideas corrupting of the Chinese populace, either of which, or both in combination, 
could lead to the delegitimisation of the CCP and the destabilisation of the Chinese state. In 
this context, the pursuit of Internet sovereignty is both a justification of its domestic policies 
and an attempt to ward off foreign interference both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’.  
In the latter register, Internet sovereignty serves an important international function, as 
China attempts to shape international norms around inter-state behaviour in cyberspace and the 
nature of statehood in the informationalised 21st century. A group of countries have already 
aligned with China’s normative positions in cyber governance, which are antagonistic to those 
promoted by the US and its allies. In this regard, China has elevated its leadership status by 
providing an alternative to Western cyber governance.   
At the same time, this attempt to reshape cyber norms also helps to improve the CCP’s 
domestic legitimacy and improve regime security. In this way, Internet sovereignty serves both 
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domestic and foreign policy goals, united by a fundamental concern with the maintenance of 
the Chinese state. In the global arena, however, the relevant discourse is not yet sufficiently 
developed to be either convincing or practical, let alone widely applied in governing global 
cyberspace. This has no doubt significantly restricted China’s capacity to challenge existing 
cyber norms. Without a more rigorous and practical theory of Internet sovereignty and global 
cyber governance, China can hardly transform itself from a norm taker to a norm shaper, not 
to mention a norm maker.  
 
About the Authors 
Jinghan Zeng is Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at 
Royal Holloway, University of London. His research lies in the field of Chinese politics with 
more specific interests in the study of China's authoritarian politics, political communication, 
political economy and foreign policy. He is the author of The Chinese Communist Party's 
Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy and Party Cohesion (Palgrave, 2015).  
Tim Stevens is Lecturer in Global Security in the Department of War Studies, King's 
College London. He has published on cybersecurity and related issues in a wide range of media 
and peer-reviewed journals. His recent book is Cyber Security and the Politics of Time 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016) and he is the co-author of Cyberspace and the State 
(Routledge, 2011). He is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, London. 
Yaru Chen is Research Fellow at the Warwick Business School, University of 
Warwick. Her research interests include public management and governance in the UK and 
China. 
 
References 
FRANCE-PRESSE, AGENCE. 2015. “China Passes New National Security Law Extending 
Control Over Internet.” 1 July. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/01/china-national-security-law-internet-
regulation-cyberspace-xi-jinping   
AGNEW, JOHN. 2009. Globalization and Sovereignty. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
AN, JING. 2016. 网络主权原则是全球网络治理的必然选择 (Internet sovereignty is a 
necessary choice of global cyber governance), 红旗文稿 (Red Flag Manuscript) 4: 30-31. 
BARLOW, JOHN PERRY. 1996. “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.” 
Accessed on January 26, 2017. Available online at https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-
independence  
BETZ, DAVID J., and TIM STEVENS. 2011. Cyberspace and the State: Toward a Strategy 
for Cyber-Power. London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
BRANTLY, AARON FRANKLIN. 2014. “The Cyber Losers.” Democracy & Security 10 
(2): 132-155. Accessed on 30 January, 2017. Available online at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17419166.2014.890520  
19 
 
BRESLIN, SHAUN. 2012. “China and the Arab Awakening.” ISPI Analysis 140: 1-8, 
Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/analysis_140_2012.pdf  
BROUSSEAU, ERIC, MERYEM MARZOUKI, and CÉCILE MÉADEL, eds. 2012. 
Governance, Regulation and Powers on the Internet. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
CARTER, LIZ. 2015. Let 100 Voices Speak: How the Internet is Transforming China and 
Changing Everything. London: I.B. Tauris. 
CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER. 2016. 中国互联网络发展状
况统计报告 (Report of China’s Internet Development). 
CHEN, LEI. 2015. 全球互联网治理 “中国方案”解读 (Interpret “Chinese solution” to global 
cyberspace governance), 法制日报(Legal Daily). 
CHEN, QI. 2014. 网络安全、网络战争与国际法术——从《塔林手册》切入 (Cyber 
security, cyber war and international spells), 政治与法律 (Political Science and Law) 7: 147-
160. 
CLOVER, CHARLES. 2016. “China: When Big Data Meets Big Brother.” Financial Times, 
January 19. Accessed January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b5b13a5e-b847-11e5-b151-8e15c9a029fb.html#axzz40G2n0kmE  
COHEN, JEAN L. 2012. Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, 
and Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
CORNISH, PAUL. 2015. “Governing Cyberspace through Constructive Ambiguity.” 
Survival 57 (3): 153-176. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2015.1046230  
CUI, WENBO. 2013. 《塔林手册》对我国网络安全利益的影响 (The Influence on 
Chinese Cyber Security Interest of Tallinn Manual), 江南社会学院学报 (Journal of 
Jiangnan Social University) 15 (3): 22-26. 
DEIBERT, RONALD J. 2010. “The Geopolitics of Internet Control: Censorship, 
Sovereignty, and Cyberspace.” In Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics, edited by Andrew 
Chadwick and Philip N. Howard. London: Routledge. 323-336. 
DEIBERT, RONALD J. 2015. “Cyberspace Under Siege.” Journal of Democracy 26 (3): 64-
78. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/586479  
DEIBERT, RONALD J., JOHN G. PALFREY, RAFAL ROHOZINSKI, and JONATHAN 
ZITTRAIN, eds. 2011. Access Contested: Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian 
Cyberspace. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
DEMCHAK, CHRIS, and PETER DOMBROWSKI. 2013. “Cyber Westphalia: Asserting 
State Prerogatives in Cyberspace.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, special 
issue, International Engagement on Cyber III: State Building on a New Frontier, 29-38. 
20 
 
Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at http://journal.georgetown.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/gjia13003_Demchak-CYBER-III.pdf  
DENARDIS, LAURA. 2014. The Global War for Internet Governance. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
DIAMOND, LARRY. 2010. “Liberation Technology.” Journal of Democracy 21 (3): 69-83. 
Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/385959/summary  
DICKSON, BRUCE. 2011. “No ‘Jasmine’ for China.” Current History 110 (737): 211-216. 
Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://search.proquest.com/openview/018cd5e2ad4d49b5e43697fa528ec637/1?pq-
origsite=gscholar&cbl=41559  
DONG, BULIANG. 2015. 网络主权是个什么东西 (what is Internet Sovereignty?) blog 
post. Accessed on 30 January 2017. Available online at 
http://hk.on.cc/cn/bkn/cnt/commentary/20151220/bkncn-20151220000319783-
1220_05411_001.html  
DU, ZHICHAO, and YUXIA NAN. 2014. 网络主权与国家主权的关系探析 (Analysis of 
the relationship between Internet sovereignty and national sovereignty), 西南石油大学学报
（社会科学版） Journal of Southwest Petroleum University（Social Sciences Edition）16 
(6): 79-84. 
DUNN CAVELTY, MYRIAM. 2007. Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to 
Secure the Information Age. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. 
EBERT, HANNES, and TIM MAURER. 2013. “Contested Cyberspace and Rising Powers.” 
Third World Quarterly 34 (6): 1054-1074. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2013.802502  
FU, CHUANHENG. 2015. 习近平互联网大会剑指网络自由——一场注定要失败的战争 
(Xi Jinping’s sword points to cyber freedom – a doomed war) blog post. Accessed on 1 
February, 2017. Available online at 
http://blog.boxun.com/hero/201601/xinwenmingluntan/1_1.shtml  
GAO, QIQI, and JIANLIN CHEN. 2016. 中美网络主权观念的认知差异及竞合关系 
(Cognitive Differences and Competitive and Cooperative Relations in Understanding Internet 
Sovereignty between the US and China), 国际论坛 (International Forum) 18 (5): 1-7. 
GOURLEY, STEPHEN K. 2014. “Cyber Sovereignty.” In Conflict and Cooperation in 
Cyberspace: The Challenge to National Security, edited by Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos 
and Adam B. Lowther. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis. 277-290. 
GREENWALD, GLENN, and EWAN MACASKILL. 2013. “NSA PRISM Program Taps In 
to User Data of Apple, Google and Others.” The Guardian, 7 June. Accessed on January 30, 
2017. Available online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-
nsa-data 
21 
 
GUO, QINGGUANG. 1999. 传播学教程 (Journalism & Communication), Beijing: Renmin 
University Press 
GUO, YUJUN. 2010. 网络社会的国际法律问题研究 (Studies on international law in 
network society), Wuhan: Wuhan University Press 
HAN, XIANYANG. 2016. 中国在互联网全球治理中发挥重要作用 (China plays an 
important role in global cyber governance), 光明日报 (Guangming Daily), 9 November. 
Accessed on 30 January 2017. Available online at http://news.gmw.cn/2016-
11/09/content_22892833.htm  
HAO, YELI. 2015, 大国网络战略博弈与中国网络强国战略 (Strategy Game of Cyber 
Power and China's Cyber Power Strategy), 国际关系研究 (Journal of International 
Relations) 3: 3-15. 
HELD, DAVID, ANTHONY MCGREW, DAVID GOLDBLATT and JONATHAN 
PERRATON. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
HITCHENS, THERESA. 2014. Speech for High-Level Seminar “Cybersecurity: Global 
responses to a Global Challenge”. 21 March, Madrid.  
HUGHES, CHRISTOPHER, and GUDRUN WACKER, eds. 2003. China and the Internet: 
Politics of the Digital Leap Forward. London: Routledge. 
INKSTER, NIGEL. 2015. China’s Cyber Power. London: Routledge for the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies.  
IRION, KRISTINA. 2012. “Government Cloud Computing and National Data Sovereignty.” 
Policy & Internet 4 (3-4): 40-71. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1002/poi3.10/full  
JIANG, MIN. 2010. “Authoritarian Informationalism: China’s Approach to Internet 
Sovereignty.” SAIS Review of International Affairs 30 (2): 71-89. Accessed on January 30, 
2017. Available online at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/403440  
JOHNSON, DAVID R. and DAVID G. Post. 1997. “The Rise of Law on the Global 
Network.” In Borders in Cyberspace: Information Policy and the Global Information 
Infrastructure, edited by Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
3-47. 
KEOHANE, ROBERT O. 2002. “Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the 
United States.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (4): 743-765. Accessed on 
January 30, 2017. Available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-
5965.00396/abstract  
KESSLER, GLENN. 2016. “Cruz’s Claim that ICANN’s Transition Will Empower Foes to 
Censor the Internet.” The Washington Post, 21 September. Accessed 26 January 2016. 
Available online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2016/09/21/cruzs-claim-that-icanns-transition-will-empower-foes-to-censor-the-
internet  
22 
 
KING, GARY, JENNIFER PAN, and MARGARET E. ROBERTS. 2013. “How Censorship 
in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression.” American 
Political Science Review 107 (2): 326-343. Accessed January 30, 2017. Available online at 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000014  
KONG, XIAOWEI. 2000. 全球化进程中的信息主权 (Information Sovereignty in the 
process of globalization), 国际论坛 (International Forum) 2 (5): 13-17. 
KRASNER, STEPHEN D. 2001. “Abiding Sovereignty.” International Political Science 
Review 22 (3): 229-251. Accessed on 26 January, 2017. Available at 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601484  
LAO, LIU and XIAO XIANG.1998. 网络与国家主权 (Internet and national sovereignty), 资
料通讯 (Information Communication) 12.  
LEAVITT, SANDRA R. 2012. “Problems in Collective Action.” In Conflict and 
Cooperation in the Global Commons: A Comprehensive Approach for International Security, 
edited by Scott Jasper. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 23-39 
LI, DANDAN. 2016. 国家网信办：中方欢迎美国向 ICANN移交管理权 (The National 
Internet Information Office: China welcomes the US’ handover of management right to 
ICANN), 新京报(The Beijing News), 12 October. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available 
online at http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2016/10/12/419563.html  
LI, MINGTAO. 2015. 主张”互联网主权”的实质是。。。(the essence of asserting internet 
sovereignty is… ), published on Wechat public account 七思而在 (qi si er zai) 
LINDSAY, JON R., and DEREK S. REVERON. 2015. “The Rise of China and the Future of 
Cybersecurity.” In China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital 
Domain, edited by Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung and Derek S. Reveron. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 333-352. 
LIVINGSTON, SCOTT D. 2015. ‘Beijing Touts “Cyber-Sovereignty” in Internet 
Governance.’ China File, 19 February. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/beijing-touts-cyber-sovereignty-
internet-governance    
LIU, XIAOQIAN, and FUYANG CHANG. 2005. 信息时代的国家主权 (State Sovereignty 
in the Information Age), 江南社会学院学报 (Journal of Jiangnan Social University) 7 (3): 
15-19. 
LIU, YANGZI. 2012. 对国家网络主权的理解 (Understanding of national internet 
sovereignty), 中国信息安全(China’s information security) 11: 62-66. 
LIU, YU, and DINGDING CHEN. 2012. “Why China Will Democratize” The Washington 
Quarterly 35 (1): 41-63. Accessed on January 30, 2016. Available online at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.641918  
23 
 
LU, CHUANYIN. 2014. 主权概念的演进及其在网络时代面临的挑战 (The evolution of 
sovereignty and its challenges in the era of Internet ), 国际关系研究 (Studies on 
International Relations) 1. 
 
LUKASIK, STEPHEN J. 2000. “Protecting the global information commons.” 
Telecommunications Policy 24 (6-7): 519-531. Accessed 26 January, 2017. Available online 
at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308596100000380  
 
LYNCH, MARC. 2011. “After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the 
Authoritarian Arab State.” Perspectives on Politics 9 (2): 301-310. Accessed on January 30, 
2017. Available online at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592711000910  
MACKINNON, REBECCA. 2012. Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for 
Internet Freedom. New York: Basic Books. 
Mearsheimer, John. 2014. “Can China Rise Peacefully?.” The National Interest, 25 October. 
Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204  
MOROZOV, EVGENY. 2011. The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate the World. New 
York: Public Affairs.  
MUELLER, MILTON L. 2010. Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet 
Governance. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
MUELLER, MILTON L. 2011. “China and Global Internet Governance: A Tiger by the 
Tail.” In Access Contested: Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace, edited by 
Ronald J. Deibert, John G. Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press. 177-194. 
MUELLER, MILTON L. 2017. Will the Internet Fragment? Sovereignty, Globalization and 
Cyberspace. Cambridge: Polity. 
NOCETTI, JULIEN. 2015. “Contest and Conquest: Russia and Global Internet Governance.” 
International Affairs 91 (1): 111-130. Accessed January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12189/abstract  
NOESSELT, NELE. 2014. “Microblogs and the Adaptation of the Chinese Party-State’s 
Governance Strategy.” Governance 27 (3): 449-468. Accessed on January 30, 2017. 
Available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/gove.12045/full  
NORDIN, ASTRID, and LISA RICHAUD. 2014. “Subverting Official Language and 
Discourse in China? Type River Crab for Harmony.” China Information 28 (1): 47-67. 
Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0920203X14524687  
NYE, JOSEPH S., Jr. 2014. The Regime Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities. 
Global Commission on Internet Governance Paper Series 1. Global Commission on Internet 
Governance: Waterloo, ON and Chatham House: London. Accessed on January 30, 2017. 
Available online at https://www.cigionline.org/publications/regime-complex-managing-
global-cyber-activities  
24 
 
PEOPLE’S DAILY. 2014. 弘扬传统友好 共谱合作新篇 (Full text of Xi Jinping’s talk on 
“Carry forward traditional friendship and compose a new chapter of cooperation”), accessed 
on 30 January 2017. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-
07/17/c_1111665403.htm; English translation from Michael D. Swaine. 2014. “Xi Jinping’s 
Trip to Latin America.” China Leadership Monitor 45. Accessed on 14 July 2016. Available 
online at http://www.hoover.org/research/xi-jinpings-trip-latin-america  
PIEKE, FRANK N. 2012. “The Communist Party and Social Management in China.” China 
Information 26 (2): 149-165. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0920203X12442864  
PITT, DOUGLAS, NIALL LEVINE, and XU YAN. 1996. “Touching Stones to Cross the 
River: Evolving Telecommunication Policy Priorities in Contemporary China.” Journal of 
Contemporary China 5 (13): 347-365. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670569608724259  
POWERS, SHAWN M., and MICHAEL JABLONSKI. 2015. The Real Cyber War: The 
Political Economy of Internet Freedom. Urbana, Chicago and Springfield, IL: University of 
Illinois Press. 
PU, XIAOYU. 2012. “Socialisation as a Two-Way Process: Emerging Powers and the 
Diffusion of International Norms.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 5 (4): 341-
367. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/5/4/341/394716/Socialisation-as-a-Two-way-Process-
Emerging-Powers  
RAMZY, AUSTIN. 2011. “State Stamps Out Small ‘Jasmine’ Protests in China.” Time, 21 
February. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2052860,00.html  
RANKIN, MARY BACKUS. 2002. “Nationalistic Contestation and Mobilization Politics: 
Practice and Rhetoric of Railway-Rights Recovery at the End of the Qing.” Modern China 28 
(3): 315-361. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3181336  
REIDENBERG, JOEL R. 1997. “Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace.” In 
Borders in Cyberspace: Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure, edited 
by Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 84-105.  
REN, MINGYAN. 2007. 互联网背景下国家信息主权问题研究 (Studies on information 
sovereignty in the context of Internet), 河北法学 (Hebei Law Science), 25 (6): 71-74 & 94. 
RÕIGAS, HENRY. 2015. “An Updated Draft of the Code of Conduct Distributed in the 
United Nations – What’s New?” Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
https://ccdcoe.org/updated-draft-code-conduct-distributed-united-nations-whats-new.html  
ROSENAU, JAMES and ERNST-OTTO CZEMPIEL. 1992. Governance without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press. 
RUAN, LOTUS, JEFFREY KNOCKEL, JASON Q. NG, and MASASHI CRETE-
NISHIHATA. 2016. “One App, Two Systems: How WeChat uses one censorship policy in 
25 
 
China and another internationally.” Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
https://citizenlab.org/2016/11/wechat-china-censorship-one-app-two-systems/  
SARAN, SAMIR. 2016. “Striving for an International Consensus on Cyber Security: Lessons 
from the 20th Century.” Global Policy 7(1): 93-95. Accessed on January 27, 2017. Available 
online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12317/full  
SASSEN, SASKIA. 1996. Losing Control? Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
SCHLÆGER, JESPER, and MIN JIANG. 2014. “Official Microblogging and Social 
Management by Local Governments in China.” China Information 28 (2): 189-213. Accessed 
on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0920203X14533901  
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N., ed. 2013. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to 
Cyber Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
SHEN, YI. 2013. “GG2022 – Developing a Code of Conduct for Internet Governance.” 
Global Policy, 5th December. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/05/12/2013/gg2022-%E2%80%93-developing-
code-conduct-internet-governance  
SHEN, YI. 2016. “Cyber Sovereignty and the Governance of Global Cyberspace.” Chinese 
Political Science Review 1 (1): 81-93. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-016-0002-6  
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST. 2013. “‘I Am Like a Ghost Now’, Says Censored 
Outspoken Scholar Zhang Lifan.” 14 November. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available 
online at http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1355832/i-am-ghost-now-says-
censored-outspoken-scholar-zhang-lifan 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST. 2014. “Four Months After Prostitution Arrest, 
Influential Investor Charles Xue Remains Uncharged.” 11 January. Accessed on January 30, 
2017. Available online at http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1403009/four-
months-after-prostitution-arrest-influential-investor  
STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA. 2016. 国家信息化发展战略纲要 (National Information 
Development Strategy Outline). Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-07/27/content_5095336.htm  
STEVENS, TIM. 2012. “A Cyberwar of Ideas? Deterrence and Norms in Cyberspace.” 
Contemporary Security Policy 33 (1): 148-170. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available 
online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2012.659597  
STEVENS, TIM. 2015a. “Roar of China’s ‘Great Cannon’ Heard Across the Internet.” The 
Conversation. 15 April. Accessed on 26 January, 2017. Available online at 
https://theconversation.com/roar-of-chinas-great-cannon-heard-across-the-internet-40201  
STEVENS, TIM. 2015b. “BRICS Set Out Vision for International Information Security.” 
Thesigers, 1 July. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
26 
 
http://thesigers.com/analysis/2015/7/3/brics-set-out-vision-for-international-information-
security  
STEVENS, TIM. 2016. Cyber Security and the Politics of Time. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
STEVENS, TIM. 2017. “Cyberweapons: An Emerging Global Governance Architecture.” 
Palgrave Communications 3 (16102). Accessed on 26 January 2017. Available online at 
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/articles/palcomms2016102  
STRANGE, SUSAN. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World 
Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
SULLIVAN, JONATHAN. 2014. “China’s Weibo: Is Faster Different?” New Media & 
Society 16 (1): 24-37. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1461444812472966  
TSAI, WEN-HSUAN, and NICOLA DEAN. 2013. “The CCP's Learning System: Thought 
Unification and Regime Adaptation.” China Journal 69: 87-107. Accessed on  January 30, 
2017. Available online at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/668806  
VAN EETEN, MICHEL J.G. and MILTON L. MUELLER. 2012. “Where is the Governance 
in Internet Governance?” New Media & Society 15 (5): 720-736. Accessed on January 30, 
2017. Available online at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1461444812462850  
WALTON, GREG. 2001. China’s Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of 
Surveillance Technology in the People’s Republic of China. Montreal: International Centre 
for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available 
online at http://open.canada.ca/vl/en/doc/publications-421743  
WANG, CHINGLUN. 2012. 倡导网络主权极其重要 (To promote Internet Sovereignty is 
extremely important), 光明日报 (Guangming Daily), 28 April. Accessed on January 30, 2017. 
Available online at http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2012-
04/28/nw.D110000gmrb_20120428_2-03.htm  
WANG, JUN. 2013. 筑牢网络边疆的防护墙 (To build a protective wall of Internet border), 
中国国防报 (China National Defense News), 24 June.  
WU, TIMOTHY S. 1997. “Cyberspace Sovereignty? The Internet and the International 
System.” Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 10 (3): 647-666. Accessed on January 30, 
2017. Available online at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/hjlt10&id=657  
XINHUA NEWS. 2015. 习近平在第二届世界互联网大会开幕式上的讲话 (Xi Jinping’s 
talk in the second World Internet Conference). 16 December. Accessed on January 30, 2017. 
Available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-12/16/c_1117481089.htm  
YAN, XU. 2002. "China’s Accession to the WTO and Its Implications for Foreign Direct 
Investment in Chinese Telecommunications." Communications and Strategies 45: 17-31  
YANG, GUOBIN. 2009. The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online. New 
York: Columbia University Press  
27 
 
YANG, ZEWEI. 2006. 主权论—国际法上的主权问题及其发展趋势研究 (Sovereignty: 
studies on the issue of sovereignty in international law and the development trends). Beijing: 
Peking University Press.  
YANG, ZEWEI. 2012. 国际法析论 (Analysis of International Law). Beijing: Renmin 
University Press. 
YAP, CHUIN-WEI, and GILLIAN WONG. 2015. “China Wants to Tap Big Data to Build a 
Bigger Brother.” The Wall Street Journal, 6 November. Accessed on January 30, 2017. 
Available online at http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/index.php?p=28059&preview=true  
YE, ZHENG. 2015. 网络主权已成为国家主权的全新制高点 (Internet Sovereignty has 
become the new commanding heights of national sovereignty), 中国青年报 (Newspaper of 
Chinese Youth). Accessed on 14 July 2016. Available online at 
http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2015-07/10/nw.D110000zgqnb_20150710_4-09.htm    
 
YE, ZHENG, and BAOXIAN ZHAO. 2014. 关于网络主权，网络边疆，网络国防的思考 
(Thoughts on Internet Sovereignty, Internet Frontier and Internet Defense), 中国信息安全
(China’s information security) 1: 28-31. 
 
YU, LI. 2012. 如何认识与维护互联网主权 (How to understand and protect Internet 
sovereignty), People’s Daily, 2 February. 
 
YU, MINGCAI, ed. 2003. 国际法专论 (Studies in International Law), Beijing: Citic 
Publishing House. 
 
YU, TANFEI. 2015. 网络主权：一枚弱民弱国的护身符(Internet Sovereignty: An amulet 
of the weak state and the weak people ). 20 December. Accessed on January 30, 2017. 
Available online at 
https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/letscorp_archive/archives/99243  
 
YUAN, YI. 2016a. 网络空间的国界在哪 (Where are the national border of cyberspace?)，
学习时报 (Study Times). 19 May. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://www.studytimes.cn/zydx/KJJS/JUNSZL/2016-05-19/5690.html  
YUAN, YI. 2016b. 如何为网络空间划分国界 (How to define national border in 
cyberspace?) 中国信息安全 (China Information Security) 9: 28-29. 
ZENG, JINGHAN. 2015. The Chinese Communist Party's Capacity to Rule: Ideology, 
Legitimacy and Party Cohesion. London: Palgrave Macmillan.   
ZENG, JINGHAN. 2016a. “China’s Date with Big Data: Will It Strengthen or Threaten 
Authoritarian Rule?” International Affairs 92 (6): 1443-1462. Accessed on January 30, 2017. 
Available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12750/full  
ZENG, JINGHAN. 2016b. “Constructing a ‘New Type of Great Power Relations’: The State 
of Debate in China (1998-2014).” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 18 
(2): 422-442. Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1369148115620991  
28 
 
ZENG, JINGHAN. 2017. “Does Europe Matter? The Role of Europe in Chinese Narratives 
of ‘One Belt One Road’ and ‘New Type of Great Power Relations’.” JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, forthcoming. 
ZENG, JINGHAN, and SHAUN BRESLIN. 2016. “China’s ‘New Type of Great Power 
Relations’: a ‘G2’ with Chinese Characteristics?” International Affairs 92 (4): 773-794. 
Accessed on January 30, 2017. Available online at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12656/abstract  
ZENG, JINGHAN, YUEFAN XIAO, and SHAUN BRESLIN. 2015. “Securing China’s Core 
Interests: The State of Debate in China.” International Affairs 91 (2): 245-266. Accessed on 
January 30, 2017. Available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-
2346.12233/abstract  
ZHANG, CHUNHOU. 2012. 全球化和互联网时代的国家主权、民族国家与网络殖民主
义 (National sovereignty, nation-state and cyber colonialism in the era of globalization and 
Internet), 马克思主义与现实 (Marxism and Reality) 4: 32-41. 
ZHANG, XINBAO and YAN REN. 2016. 网络主权的理论与网络空间法治 (The theory of 
Internet Sovereignty and rule of law in cyberspace), 法制日报 (Legal Daily), 28 September. 
ZHENG, YONGNIAN. 2007. Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society 
in China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
ZHU, LIXIN. 2015. 聚焦《塔林手册》透视网络战规则 (Focusing on “Tallinn Manual”), 
中国信息安全 (China’s information security) 10. 
 
Acknowledgements 
We are grateful for the valuable feedback provided by five anonymous referees of Politics and 
Policy. 
